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Truth and Its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay
and Confrontation
by
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN*
In this paper, I will look at the problem of hearsay and
confrontation through the lens offered by this symposium's theme of
"truth and its rivals." I will ask: To what extent does the law of
hearsay and confrontation aspire to achieve the goal of truth in
litigation? To what extent does it, or should it, seek to achieve other
goals, or to satisfy other constraints on the litigation system? And,
given the ends that it seeks to achieve, what should the shape of the
law in this area be?
My principal conclusions are as follows: In most settings, the law
of hearsay should be concerned nearly exclusively with achieving the
goal of truth determination, subject to constraints related to the cost
of litigation. For the most part, the current law of hearsay does a
poor job in this respect and even is sometimes counterproductive. In
one setting of great importance, what I will call the confrontation
setting, the law in this area has a great service to perform. That
service-protecting the conditions under which testimony against an
accused is taken-bears some relation to truth determination but is
not dominated by it and has very little to do with cost considerations.
In this context, the United States Supreme Court has generally been
insufficiently protective of the accused's rights, regarding hearsay law
as an old-fashioned nuisance that must be tolerated to a minimal
extent but that should be kept firmly in its place.
To provide some groundwork for my discussion of hearsay
topics, I will address rather briefly the general theme of "truth and its
rivals."
L Truth and Its Rivals: Goals and Constraints
I remember that at an evidence conference in 1991, one of the
participating scholars-I do not remember who-asked who in the
audience accepted the proposition that determination of truth is the
principal goal of the adjudicative system. The questioner clearly
believed the proposition to be true and found it frustrating that many
people did not. My own view is a qualified one. I do accept that the
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Many thanks to Craig
Callen for a careful read and helpful suggestions.
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attempt to determine the truth is the principal goal of adjudication.
But to say this does not get us very far because adjudication must
operate subject to various significant constraints, some of which
derogate the search for truth.
I will not discuss the philosophical questions of whether there is
such a thing as truth, or what it is. For that matter, I will not focus on
the narrower question of the distinctions between fact and law, or
between fact and norm.' Trials, and hearsay law, concern principally
an inquiry into what happened,2 and the truth, for our purposes, is
what in fact happened.3 Now obviously, we may never know what
happened, and even if we do our characterizations of any event are
heavily laden by our perspectives and values.' But these problems do
not change the fact of what happened. The green car was going
however fast it was going, and that speed is a fact, whether we say
that it was going slowly, at a reasonable rate of speed, at 40 miles per
hour, or too fast.
In thinking about the goals of litigation, I want to first pose an
unreal, almost utopian world. Suppose we had easy, costless access to
the Great Omniscience (G.O.), who knows fully the facts of any
litigated dispute and can report them with complete accuracy in
language that legal decisionmakers could understand. Would we not
readily agree to depend on his reports, instead of having to go
through the rigamarole of trial?5 Even if the G.O., understanding and
exploiting his monopoly position, decided to charge us what it would
cost to have a trial, we would find the deal a good one because his
product is better. This system of adjudication would not offer us any
benefits other than perfect accuracy in fact-finding, but that is a
benefit of enormous value, and it makes the system worthwhile.
There are other goals that may be achieved by trials, but I do not
1. I am using the term "norm" in the sense of a prescribed standard of conduct or
decision, such as "reasonable care."
2. To some extent, trials also concern what will likely happen in the future, or what
would likely happen given some set of conditions. For example, in a torts action, if the
plaintiff demonstrates liability, damages for lost earnings equal the amount by which
plaintiff's anticipated future earnings are less than the earnings the plaintiff likely would
have had if the tort had not been committed.
3. See generally MIRJAN R. DAMA KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 94-95 (1997).
4. See generally WILLIAM TWINING, Some Scepticism about Some Scepticisms, in
RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 92-152 (1990). Twining explores a
range of skeptical views, including "philosophical scepticism," referring to "fundamental
doubts about the possibility of knowledge or of reason or of objective values." Id. at 94-
95.
5. Medieval adjudication made this choice: Evidence-dependent adjudication was
not necessary because mechanisms like the ordeal were thought to reveal the word of
God. If we still had the old-time religion, the ordeal would still be a good means of
decisionmaking.
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believe that they need to corrupt the fact-finding mission in this
hypothetical world. I will discuss in turn the goals of determination of
norms, dispute resolution, satisfaction of the parties, general
acceptance of litigation results, and fairness.
The system I have described does not assist us in determining
norms-that, says the G.O., is not his job. It may well be that we
cannot adequately determine the norms that should govern in a
particular factual setting except when the setting is actually presented;
concrete cases focus the mind. And it may be-at least in criminal
cases, and, in the United States, in many civil cases as well-that we
positively prefer some of these particularistic norms to be made by a
jury. So norm determination is a goal that we should attempt to
achieve, in part, through trials. But that task, as I have suggested, is
conceptually a severable one from fact-finding. If the G.O. could give
us "just the facts," we could submit them to a jury to ask, subject to
whatever constraints appear appropriate, what the consequences of
those facts should be: "You have heard what the doctor did. Now
you must decide whether this should be deemed reasonable care."
Another goal that has been cited for litigation is dispute
resolution.6 It may be that in some sense this goal takes precedence
over the goal of truth determination. If the parties resolve their
entire dispute, the court does not ordinarily require that they
nevertheless litigate to determine the facts, and if they wish to put
aside part of a potential dispute, by stipulating to some fact, the court
will not usually examine the stipulated fact with care to determine
whether it is indeed true. Nevertheless, I believe that determination
of the truth is the best way the adjudicative system can contribute to
dispute resolution. Suppose the parties have confidence that, if
allowed to play out to the fullest, the adjudicative system will in all
likelihood determine the truth. Then the adjudicative system may
wisely let the chips fall where they may, allowing the parties to
resolve their dispute by invoking the adjudicative system to whatever
extent they find appropriate.7
Similar arguments can, I believe, be made with respect to the
potential goals of satisfaction of the parties and general acceptance of
the results of the litigation. If the Great Omniscience is able to
guarantee accurate and inexpensive results, those results will usually
6. See DAMA9KA, supra note 3, at 110-24 (contending this is the principal objective
of both civil and criminal litigation in the common law system); Twining, supra note 4, at
131-32 (referring to this view as a species of "nature-of-the-enterprise" skepticism and
emphasizing that to be plausible it must make room for concepts such as "rectitude of
decision").
7. I explore this point further in another article. Richard E. Friedman, Anchors and
Flotsam, 107 YALE LJ. 1921 (1998).
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gain broad acceptance. Prevailing parties will presumably be satisfied
and, while losers may complain, they have nothing valid to complain
about because they deserved to lose.
For much the same reason, the goal of fairness does not seem to
conflict with truth determination in this idealized world. Results are
perfectly accurate, so there is no concern about an intolerable
distribution of erroneous results. And there does not seem to be any
unfairness in process, for the adjudicative system has simply consulted
an omniscient factfinder.
So this little exercise suggests that, in an ideal world,
determination of truth is the pre-eminent, if not the exclusive, goal of
adjudication-the only goal that we need worry about. But as we
move from this ideal world to the real world, we must be careful of
the problem of the "second best," which warns us that if an ideal state
is not attainable a move in the direction of achieving any given part of
that ideal state is not necessarily optimal.8 This problem suggests that
truth determination need not necessarily be preeminent in the far
from ideal world of litigation in which we actually live. Perfect
accuracy in fact-finding is not attainable, at least not without
intolerable cost. The goals of dispute resolution, general acceptance,
party satisfaction, and fairness-all of which would, I have argued, be
achieved naturally in a world of perfect fact-finding-will not
necessarily be achieved in the real world. We may, therefore, have to
engage in tradeoffs between these goals.
I believe, though, that much of what I have said carries over to
the real world. Improving accuracy in truth determination will tend
in most situations towards the achievement of these other goals. I do
not mean that truth determination will be optimized by the same
system that will optimize the other goals; I do mean that, starting
from any given point, a change that improves the system's truth-
determining capacity is likely to be neutral or better with respect to
the other goals. Put another way, a change that makes the system a
less satisfactory mechanism for truth determination is usually unlikely
to improve it along any of the other dimensions. Only with caution,
therefore, should we decline to optimize truth determination in
deference to one of the other goals.
The goal of fairness warrants particular attention. Arguably, the
allocation of errors is one aspect of fairness. That is, one might say
that a system that yields errors disproportionately favoring one side
to the litigation is not fair. This is an interesting question, and I
cannot go into it in depth here. But here is a brief perspective, based
on decision theory. My view is that, at least for the most part, we
8. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who
Should Regulate Whom?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498,2632 & n.148 (1997).
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need not worry about allocation of errors as such, and that instead
our goal should be to minimize the cost of errors-or more precisely,
to maximize the expected value of the outcome of our adjudicative
system.
Let us say that we count an inaccurate result for the plaintiff in a
civil case as being as bad as an inaccurate result for the defendant
(and an accurate result for one as being as good as an accurate result
for the other). Given these assumptions, if a proposed change in the
system would eliminate pro-plaintiff errors more than it would create
pro-defendant errors, then that change maximizes expected value,
and it ought to be made-no matter what (or at least almost no
matter what) the prior allocation of errors. I believe fairness as well
as accuracy demands this result. It is not fair to the defendant to
refuse to make such a change, which offers an attractive tradeoff in
truth determination. By the same token, in a criminal case, because
pro-prosecution errors are so much worse than pro-defense errors, a
change that would decrease pro-prosecution errors should be made
even if it would increase the number of pro-defense errors by many
times more.9 Even though such a change would increase the total
number of errors, it would (unless the number of additional pro-
defense errors is extravagantly large in relation to the diminution of
pro-prosecution errors) decrease the total cost of the errors. Thus, it
would be a net benefit to truth determination.
I will introduce a slightly mathematical statement to crystallize
this point. Suppose we are operating in system A and are considering
a change to system B. It can be shown reasonably simply that under
the decision-theoretic perspective, a change to system B is preferable
if and only if
Probability that B will avoid a pro-opponent error
> S
Probability that B will avoid a pro-proponent error
where the proponent is the party favored by the change to system B
and the opponent is that party's adversary; an error means a factually
inaccurate result; and S is the standard of persuasion, or the level of
confidence, expressed in odds, that the factfinder must have in favor
of the proponent in order to find for the proponent (more likely than
not for the plaintiff in the usual civil case, beyond a reasonable doubt
9. I have explored these ideas in an unpublished paper called Truth and Fairness in
Adjudication (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). I believe my conclusion is
basically in accord with that of Michael L. DeKay, The Difference Between Blackstone-
Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of Proof, 21 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 95
(1996).
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for a criminal prosecutor)."
I think this simple expression offers an interesting way of looking at
probative value and prejudice, examining the impact of the evidence
on the fact-finding result. Suppose that systems A and B are identical
except that B allows the admissibility of an item of evidence offered
by the prosecution that A does not. Then the numerator of the
fraction may be regarded as the probative value of the evidence, and
the denominator may be thought of as the prejudicial impact. That is,
the numerator represents the good impact the evidence has in
reducing errors in favor of the opponent, here the defendant, and the
denominator represents the bad impact of the evidence in increasing
errors in favor of the proponent, here the prosecution. Only if the
ratio of these two is greater than S-which, given that the proponent
is a prosecutor, is very high-is system B superior.
I have said that I believe that considerations of error allocation
need enter in only slightly, at most, in determining the merits of an
adjudicative system. But there are aspects of the process as well that
might also be considered matters of fair treatment of the parties. We
would not, for example, allow the evidentiary use of a confession
procured by torture, even if we were persuaded that it is more
probative than prejudicial. The confrontation right, which I will
address in this paper, is another example of such a constraint that
operates in derogation of truth. And there are other constraints as
well, most notably the matter of cost, that could not be deemed to be
aspects of fairness.
il. Ordinary Hearsay
Now I will become less abstract and focus on hearsay. First, I
will address ordinary hearsay-that is, hearsay that clearly does not
present any confrontation issue. As to such hearsay, I believe that
truth determination ought to be the principal concern determining
admissibility, that current doctrine does a poor job reflecting this
concern, and that fairness concerns are not powerful and should not
lead to a general rule of exclusion.
10. Somewhat more elaborately, B is preferable to A if
P" -Pap>
where PK is the probability under system K that the factfinder will find for party i and in
fact party j is entitled to the verdict.
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A. The Unavailable Declarant
I want to address hearsay first by considering a rather austere
setting that does not involve confrontation rights, or the respective
abilities of the parties to produce the declarant as a witness, or any
suggestion that the out-of-court declaration was made for the purpose
of creating evidence, or that the declarant was kept away from court
by the contrivance of one of the parties.
Suppose that in a civil case, Peters v. Decker, Peters claims that
she and Decker entered into an oral contract, in face-to-face
discussions, on the morning of July 5, 1997, and that Decker testifies,
denying that he and Peters even met on that date. Peters offers the
testimony of Whitley that her husband Henry casually said to her on
the evening of that date, "I saw Peters this morning. She was talking
with Decker about something." Whitley is quite sure about the date
because the next morning Henry died of a heart attack-under utterly
unsuspicious circumstances.
Henry's statement seems clearly to be hearsay.11 An American
court would have to consider whether it fits within any of the
standard exemptions from the law of hearsay, such as those
enumerated in FED. R. EvID. 803 and 804. It appears not to. The
court would then have to consider whether nevertheless it ought to
admit the statement under its residual authority, now expressed in
Rule 807, to relieve some statements from the ban on hearsay. The
court might or might not apply the residual exception.
I think this is a bad system. I think the probable result-
exclusion-is silly. I think the indeterminacy-because, after all, the
residual exception might be invoked-is unfortunate." Not only is the
likely decision under current law unfortunate but also the structure of
decision-a broad presumptive rule of exclusion, qualified by a long
list of particular, often complex exemptions, supplemented by
residual authority to admit-is gratuitously complex. But for now,
my principal complaint is with neither the likely decision nor even the
structure of decision; rather, it is that the basic criteria of decision are
misplaced.
Under the received wisdom, the principal criteria that shape
most of the hearsay exemptions are trustworthiness and necessity."
These criteria are reflected in the residual exception as well: That
11. See FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
12. Under the system I propose, although there would not be any rule requiring
admissibility, that would still be the highly predictable result. Hence, the practical
indeterminacy of the system would be greatly reduced.
13. See 5 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1420-1423
(James H. Chadbourn rev. ed., 1974).
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exception depends, most significantly, on whether the statement has
considerable "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" and
whether it is "more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts.'
4
For now, I will postpone consideration of need and focus on the
criterion of trustworthiness or, synonymously, reliability. This is a
bad criterion, for at least three reasons.1" Perhaps most obviously, it is
notoriously difficult to determine, especially across a broad category
of cases. I think few lawyers are satisfied with the cracker-barrel
psychology that underlies exceptions like the one for excited
utterances.
Second, the trustworthiness criterion appears to put the cart
before the horse. If the question genuinely is trustworthiness, we are
asking whether the proposition the statement asserts is highly likely
to be true. But that depends on all the other evidence in the case. At
the admissibility stage, the court should not generally be required to
determine whether a litigated proposition is true; that is a matter to
be decided at the end of the case and by the jury, if there is one."
In Idaho v. Wright, the Supreme Court interpreted the
trustworthiness criterion in a way that diminishes this latter problem.7
Under the Court's interpretation (made in the confrontation context),
trustworthiness does not mean whether, on the basis of all the
evidence, the particular statement appears highly likely to be true;
rather, it means whether the circumstances surrounding the making of
the statement tend to suggest that it was truthful. 8 This cropped
14. FED. R. EVID. 807.
15. See also Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47 VAND. L. REV. 43,
95 (1994) (arguing on related grounds that "[p]remising exceptions on rulemakers'
categorical judgments of reliability or trustworthiness is flawed in several ways").
16. I do not contest the point, illustrated notably by Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171 (1987), that the court might sometimes be required, as a threshold matter in
deciding the admission of evidence, to determine the truth of a factual proposition that
happens to be similar or even identical to a proposition that the jury must decide in
determining the merits of the action. For example, in Bourjaily, the court had to
determine the existence and membership of a conspiracy for purposes of deciding whether
an offered statement fit within the hearsay exemption for statements by conspirators; the
jury also had to determine similar questions in deciding guilt on the merits. In such a case,
the congruity is, in a sense, fortuitous; the court and the jury must determine similar facts,
but only because the law governing the court's decision on the evidentiary question and
the jury's decision on the merits happen, perhaps for very different reasons, to make the
same or similar propositions material. It is an altogether different matter to say that, in
determining whether the jury should hear evidence offered to prove a proposition that the
jury must decide, the court must first decide whether, in light of that evidence, the
proposition is most likely true.
17. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
18. See id. at 820-23.
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inquiry, however, aggravates the problem of trying to assess the
probative merits of a piece of evidence by placing it in one category
or another; it means that courts must determine trustworthiness on
the basis of generalizations.
Perhaps most importantly, the trustworthiness criterion does not
reflect well whether the statement is net beneficial to truth
determination. A piece of evidence can be helpful to truth deter-
mination even if it is not particularly reliable. As the old line goes, a
brick is not a wall, 9 and a single piece of evidence can contribute
significantly to fact-finding even though it could not bear the weight
of the whole case. Suppose, for example, that three eyewitnesses
independently describe an accident similarly. The conjunction does
not dispel all doubt, for the three may have been making a common
mistake, but it is certainly stronger than the testimony of a sole
witness. Note that the paradigm of acceptable evidence-live
testimony subject to cross-examination-is not reliable. If it were, we
would rarely have a dispute in testimony.
This point may be put in more formal terms by using the concept
of the likelihood ratio, The likelihood ratio of a piece of evidence
with respect to a given proposition is the ratio of the probability that
the evidence would arise, given that the proposition is true, to the
probability that the evidence would arise given that the proposition is
false. If a statement favoring a litigated proposition has a likelihood
ratio with respect to that proposition that is not a very large
number-so that the evidence is not many times more likely to arise
given the truth of the proposition than given its falsity-we cannot
ordinarily say that the statement is trustworthy. We certainly cannot
do so if, following the Supreme Court in Wright, we are unwilling to
let corroborative evidence enter into the determination of
trustworthiness. But such "untrustworthy" evidence may have
significant probative value. For example, suppose that absent
Henry's statement the jury would assess the odds that Peters and
Decker met on July 5 as 2:3, and that it would assess the likelihood
ratio of Henry's statement with respect to the proposition as 2. That
means that the jury believes Henry is just twice as likely to have made
the statement if it was true as if it was false, and that the odds that the
proposition is true, taking into account both the statement and all the
other evidence, are 4:3. By neither standard should the statement be
considered trustworthy-and yet it clearly has very significant
probative value.' °
19. See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note (citing MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 152 at 317 (1st ed. 1954)).
20. By Bayes' Theorem, the odds of the proposition given the evidence are equal to
the odds of the proposition absent that evidence times the likelihood ratio of the evidence
Mar. 1998]
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The underlying test for truth determination is not whether the
evidence is trustworthy, but whether it is more probative than
prejudicial. Despite the objections I have voiced, trustworthiness
would nevertheless be a useful criterion for truth determination if it
sorted out evidence that satisfies this test from evidence that fails it.
But there is no reason to believe that trustworthiness performs this
task.
What is the danger of prejudice with respect to hearsay? The
danger that has frequently been articulated since the early nineteenth
century-but not before, it appears-is that the jury will be unable to
evaluate the hearsay without the procedural incidents that we
associate with live testimony: cross-examination, demeanor, and the
oath. 2 (It may be in large part because of this perceived danger that
the rule against hearsay evidence tends to be eased, or even
abrogated, in civil bench trials in the common law system.22) Thus,
according to this argument, trustworthiness is a safe harbor: If the
adjudicative system believes that the statement at issue is highly
trustworthy, then the jury cannot be making a mistake in overvaluing
the evidence because a rational factfinder ought to value the evidence
as highly as-or even more highly than-live testimony by the same
declarant of the same proposition.
I think that there is a plausible argument that each of these
procedural incidents of live testimony does help a factfinder sort out
true statements from false, in part because they tend to inhibit false
testimony more than they do true testimony. But what basis is there
to believe that absent these incidents hearsay statements would
presumptively have more of a bad impact on a jury than a good one?
Let's look separately at both sides of the problem, first probative
value and then prejudice.
Most hearsay has substantial probative value, assuming the
declarant's live testimony of the same proposition would. As assessed
from the perspective of the adjudicative system, an out-of-court
statement might lack some probative value that live testimony would
have by virtue of the extra information conveyed by the incidents of
testimony. But an ideal factfinder, suitably discounting for the
absence of those incidents, would still grant substantial probative
value to a statement like Henry's. A person other than a pathological
with respect to the proposition.
21. See Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 36 (1942).
22. See, e.g., Civil Evidence Act, 1995, ch. 1 (Eng.) (eliminating rule against hearsay
as an exclusionary rule in civil cases); THE LAW COMM'N FOR ENGLAND AND WALES,
CONSULTATION PAPER No. 117, THE HEARSAY RULE IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 52 (1991)
(emphasizing "the greatly reduced use of juries in civil trials other than for defamation
proceedings" as a ground for elimination of the hearsay rule in civil proceedings.).
[Vol. 49
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liar is substantially more likely to assert a statement if it is true than if
it is false. This is so even if the circumstances (such as Henry's poor
eyesight or the existence of a sister of Decker who looks much like
her) suggest that the statement is not extremely trustworthy.
Now, consider prejudice. The statement is only prejudicial, so far
as its hearsay nature is concerned, to the extent that the jury would
fail to discount its value by taking into account the absence of the
incidents of live testimony. But it is mere supposition to assert that
the jury will fail to discount appropriately, and will do so to such an
extent that the probative value actually exceeds the prejudicial
impact. Such empirical evidence as there is provides no support for
the proposition that juries under-discount at all-and it suggests that
they might even over-discount."
I do not put out of mind the possibility that in some cases,
because the jury may fail to discount on the basis of the absence of
the incidents of live testimony, hearsay evidence might be more
prejudicial than probative. But I think that such cases are relatively
rare, not enough to warrant a presumptive exclusion of hearsay. Put
another way, assuming that live testimony of the declarant would be
more probative than prejudicial, then the hearsay statement will also
be more probative than prejudicial in most cases-not only those in
which the hearsay statement is particularly trustworthy.
In the usual case, then, it is extremely likely that admission of the
statement will be net beneficial to truth determination. It is
conceivable that, although the statement itself is more probative than
prejudicial, exclusion of the statement will induce the proponent, and
future proponents in a like situation, to introduce evidence that is
better yet. Given the assumption governing this part of my analysis
that the declarant is (and at all material times was) unavailable, that
better evidence cannot consist of the live testimony of the declarant.
But it could conceivably include more complete evidence concerning
the declarant and the making of the statement-"foundation
facts"24-or the testimony of another observer. In most cases, though,
these possibilities will not be enough to make exclusion superior to
admission for the purpose of truth determination. This is because the
proponent will have full incentive to present such supplemental or
alternative information if it helps his case, and the opponent will have
23. See, e.g., Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule:
Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 MINN. L. REv. 655, 657
(1992); Peter Miene et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence,
76 MINN. L. REv. 683, 691, 695-96 (1992); Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions
of Eyewitnesses and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REv. 703,705 (1992).
24. Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1339,
1341 (1987).
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a similar incentive to present the information if it helps his case.
Absent substantial inability of the opponent to present supplemental
information diminishing the force of the hearsay, truth determination
will be assisted by admitting the hearsay and allowing the parties to
add such information as they find helpful.
I have argued that hearsay doctrine does a poor job of assisting
truth determination. Now, I will argue that truth determination is
effectively all that hearsay doctrine needs to be worried about with
respect to a statement like Henry's. Even assuming that Henry's
statement is more probative than prejudicial, notwithstanding the
absence of the incidents of live testimony, Decker may argue that it
should not be admitted because she did not have the ability to cross-
examine him. But so what? If the evidence presented by Whitley
were not a statement by her late husband but photos of an automatic
bank camera showing Peters and Decker together on July 5, 1997,
Decker would not have a serious objection based on her inability to
cross-examine the camera.
We admit all sorts of evidence that might be considered the
observations of nonhuman observers-not only of bank cameras but
also of thermometers and clocks, of parrots and bloodhounds. And
these observations might be considered merely a particular form of
trace evidence; an event or condition leaves a trace on some entity,
the trace being significantly more probable to be left assuming that
someproposition at issue is true than assuming that proposition is
false. My point is not that all these types of evidence ought usually
to be admitted; often, presumably, they should not be." But we deal
with such evidence by assessing its probative value and its prejudicial
impact, and if the former is greater than the latter we do not exclude
the evidence because it is impossible to cross-examine the entity that
bares the significant trace.
I believe the same analysis can be applied to statements made by
human observers. In a case like Henry's, something-assertedly the
event or condition described by the statement-has caused the
observer to make the statement, and so the statement might be
25. See BERNARD ROBERTSON & G.A. VIGNAUX, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE:
EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM 3 (1995) (summarizing
Locard's Principle: "Every contact leaves a trace. Whenever any two objects come into
contact with one another they affect one another in some way."). See also C.G.G.
AITKEN, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 1
(1995) (stating a similar proposition).
26. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth of the
Dog Scent Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 15 (1990) (counseling greater caution in admitting
bloodhound evidence); Andrew E. Taslitz, A Practitioner's Guide to Dog Scent Lineups,
28. CRIM. L. BULL. 218 (1992) (challenging judicial deference to dog scent lineup
evidence).
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deemed a trace of whatever that causal event or condition may be.
Indeed, cognitive psychologists have long spoken of "memory traces,"
a term reflecting the impact of the remembered event on the brain.'
I do not, of course, mean to suggest that human communication is no
more complex than a bloodhound's communicative bark or a
thermometer's display, but the question remains why the unavoidable
absence of the declarant from the witness stand should lead to
exclusion of her statement.
If it were possible to cross-examine the observer, that would raise
another consideration, which I will address shortly. But in a case like
Henry's, that is not possible. Certainly, Decker would have liked to
cross-examine Henry-but that, through no fault of Decker's, is not
possible and never was during the course of the litigation.
The situation would also be significantly different if the
statement were prepared for the litigation, for then the adjudicative
system could not treat it as a trace of some external cause or
condition; the statement would be in large part a product of the
adjudicative system itself. But Henry's statement was not prepared
for the litigation. So far as it appears, the statement is merely the
trace of an event on a human observer, of a kind with which
adjudicative factfinders, who deal all the time with human
communication, are particularly familiar and comfortable. Unfor-
tunate as Decker's inability to cross-examine Henry may be, it
provides no reason to exclude the statement, assuming the statement
would assist in the determination of truth.
I have postponed until now any consideration of necessity. What
I have said already, I think, indicates the inappropriateness of
necessity as a criterion for determining the admissibility of hearsay
like Henry's. Necessity might be a reasonable criterion if something
valuable (but not of some absolute interest that is beyond
compensation) were lost by admitting hearsay; then, only if there
were some countervailing value-some necessity-should the hearsay
be admissible.' But that, it seems to me, is not the case here. Only
truth determination is at stake here. If a material proposition is in
dispute, then there is a need for all evidence that is helpful to
determine the truth of that proposition. It is not satisfactory to say, in
effect, "Even though this evidence substantially alters the probability
of the proposition at issue, even in light of all the other evidence we
have on point, we don't want to hear this evidence because we
27. See, e.g., DANIEL L. SCHACrER, STRANGER BEHIND THE ENGRAM: THEORIES
OF MEMORY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 179 (1982).
28. Cf. Callen, supra note 15, at 95 & n.229 (finding unpersuasive a necessity
argument amounting to a contention that, because of the absence of other evidence
supporting the proponent, otherwise inadmissible evidence ought to be admitted).
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already have so much." 29 Even if other evidence would be more
probative than Henry's statement, that does not mean that Henry's
statement is not helpful to truth determination. On the other side of
the coin, if the item of evidence is net detrimental to the truth
determination process, there is no need for it. In short, all evidence is
necessary to the degree that its probative value exceeds any
prejudicial impact it is likely to have. I do not believe that necessity
adds anything to the analysis of whether the statement is beneficial
for truth determination.
I have argued in this part of my analysis that when the declarant
is unavailable, admission of hearsay will usually assist the truth
determination process if live testimony of the declarant would have
done so. Another complexity is added if the declarant is available.
B. The Available Declarant
Now vary Henry's hypothetical in one simple respect: He would
be easily available as a witness.
This factor may alter the situation significantly. Even though the
evidence of Henry's statement is more probative than prejudicial,
Henry's live testimony-perhaps supplemented by evidence of his
out-of-court statement-would presumably be better. And exclusion
of the out-of-court statement if Henry is not produced might induce
Peters to produce him as a witness.
In analyzing this situation, though, I would still put emphasis on
the fact that Henry's statement is a form of trace evidence. That is,
Decker's ability to cross-examine Henry is important, but only so far
as it assists truth determination. Peters has decided that the evidence
that is sufficient for his purposes, and most cost-effective, is Henry's
out-of-court statement, and presumably that evidence is more
probative than prejudicial. The burden should ordinarily be on
Decker to produce Henry as a witness, whether by compulsion or by
persuasion, if she really believes that doing so would help truth
determination.
I have previously suggested a procedure that, I believe, would
assist an opponent in Decker's position: If she produces the declarant
in a timely manner, the proponent must make the declarant a witness
as part of his case or forgo use of the hearsay.3" This procedure would
29. Of course, a court might appropriately say that a given piece of evidence is
cumulative, but that is a different matter. A given item of evidence is cumulative if it
would have significant probative value absent some other body of evidence but, because
that other body of evidence accomplishes much of what the given item would, it does not
in fact have significant probative value.
30. See Richard D. Friedman, Improving the Procedure for Resolving Hearsay Issues.
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help the opponent by allowing her to examine the declarant during
the proponent's case, without the need of interrupting her case to
secure a repetition of the declarant's story and elevating jury
expectations by making the declarant a witness. On further
reflection, I doubt this procedure should be used universally. I do not
believe the practical concerns with operating it are insuperable," but
in some cases I believe it concedes more to the opponent than is
necessary. It may be that truth determination is better advanced by
allowing the proponent to make his case using the evidence he deems
appropriate, and then allowing the opponent to present the evidence
she feels will help her case-which may include the live testimony by
the declarant-even though it was the proponent who offered the
declarant's prior statement. Presumably the opponent is better off
questioning the declarant in the middle of the proponent's case rather
than as part of her own, but given that the proponent is satisfied to
rest on the out-of-court statement of the declarant, it is not clear that
the opponent ought to have the opportunity to interrupt.32 But, under
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 883 (1991).
31. The procedure is subject to some abuse if a wealthy opponent obfuscates a
proponent's case by securing the presence of all the proponent's hearsay declarants. This
problem could be addressed on those occasions when it appears to arise; in most cases, it
would be apparent that this problem is not substantial. The procedure also depends on
the proponent giving sufficient advance notice of intention to use a hearsay declaration,
and in some cases this may be a problem. Again, I believe the difficulty may be addressed
case by case. The proponent might argue persuasively in some cases that he could not
have been expected to give earlier notice, and in such a case if production of the declarant
is unfeasible she probably should be deemed to be unavailable.
32. Immediate cross-examination is itself, of course, an interruption. No serious
suggestion has been made, within the Anglo-American system, that in general the
opponent's right to subject a live witness to adverse examination should be delayed until
the proponent has rested. Some jurisdictions do limit the scope of cross-examination to
matters covered in direct, and the reason seems to be to prevent the opponent from
creating an excessive interruption in the proponent's case. Thus, there is a tension
between allowing the proponent to present a relatively unobstructed case and allowing the
opponent a prompt, convenient opportunity to respond. See generally 1 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE 83-95 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing varying practices regarding the permissive
scope of cross-examination).
In an unpublished paper, I have made the suggestion that, within the current
framework of hearsay law, lawmakers might create an exception under which a proponent
could exempt a statement from the rule against hearsay by voluntarily invoking a
procedure much like the one I previously proposed. Under this proposal, the proponent
could, if he chose, give sufficient notice of his intention to use the out-of-court statement.
If the proponent did so, and if the proponent was not substantially better able than the
opponent to produce the declarant, the statement would be admissible unless the
opponent, by a designated time, produced the declarant, willing and able to testify. If the
opponent did so, the proponent would either have to put the declarant on the stand as part
of his own case or forgo use of the hearsay. See Richard D. Friedman, A Subversive
Exception to the Hearsay Rule (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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the procedure I have previously suggested or, assuming that is
unnecessary, under the traditional procedure, if the hearsay is more
probative than prejudicial and the proponent is not substantially
better able than the opponent to produce the declarant, the hearsay
should be admitted.
The situation is somewhat different if the proponent is sub-
stantially better able than the opponent to produce the declarant. In
such a case, even if the hearsay is more probative than prejudicial,
efficient truth determination might be aided by excluding the hearsay,
thus inducing the proponent to produce the declarant as a live
witness. Even in such a case, however, I think a court should hesitate
before concluding that exclusion is necessary. It may be that other
remedies, such as judicial or adversarial comment on the proponent's
failure to produce the evidence, might suffice to give the proponent
the proper incentive without requiring the exclusion of evidence that
might assist the search for truth. If hearsay evidence is excluded on
the ground that it will cause the production of better evidence by the
proponent-live testimony-it will often be a failed bluff. The
proponent's reaction to the exclusion may be to forgo use of the
evidence rather than to produce the declarant as a live witness, thus
leading to a result that is worse with respect to the very goal that
exclusion was meant to foster: truth determination.
H1. The Confrontation Setting
Now I will consider a setting, dramatically different from Henry's
case, in which a criminal defendant's confrontation rights are at stake.
In this context, I believe, considerations other than truth
determination are at stake, but the Supreme Court has not recognized
this. I will take as my keynote Lee v. Illinois.33 There, the defendant
Lee's boyfriend, Thomas, confessed to having committed a double
murder with her. At Lee's trial, though, Thomas invoked the
privilege against self-incrimination, and so the prosecution introduced
the confession instead of his testimony.
Given Thomas's refusal to testify, did use of the confession assist
truth determination? I think the answer is plainly in the affirmative.
His confession was highly probative. Thomas confessed to full
complicity in two murders. The statement seems to have been in
accordance with all the physical evidence, and it also squared in some
crucial respects with a statement made by Lee herself, the only other
surviving witness to the events at issue. The key difference is that
Thomas's statement, rather than trying to deflect culpability from
himself, indicated a greater degree of culpability on the part of both
33. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
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himself and Lee. Taking these factors together, I believe---contrary
to a narrow majority of the Supreme Court-that the confession
meets a high standard of reliability. But even if this is not so, it seems
clear that truth determination would be assisted by giving the jury
knowledge of Thomas's statement. Indeed, the contrary position
seems to be almost laughable.
And yet it also seems clear to me that the 5-4 majority of the
Supreme Court came to the correct result: Thomas's statement
should not have been admitted against Lee. Exclusion was justified
on grounds other than truth determination. Imagine for a moment
that statements like Thomas's were admissible. Then making a
statement to the police for use in investigating and prosecuting the
accused would in effect become an acceptable form of testifying
against the accused, without any need for cross-examination by the
accused. People in the position of Thomas would understand that by
making statements to the police, or even to intermediaries between
themselves and the police, they would be creating evidence that might
well be used to convict a criminal defendant.
It is helpful in this context to focus on the language of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.
Supreme Court decisions sometimes seem to read the Clause as
having incorporated Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence.'
But in fact, the Clause says nothing about hearsay. Rather, it
guarantees the right of the accused "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him" 35 At the same time, it is important to bear in
mind that not all testimony need occur in the courtroom. This, I
believe, is why Confrontation and hearsay concerns often overlap and
are often confused. Indeed, it appears rather clear that the principal
danger against which the Clause was aimed was not the possibility
that an accused would be denied the opportunity to cross-examine a
witness who testified at trial. Rather, the concern was the practice by
which some witnesses had testified out of court and out of the
presence of the accused. This was the standard procedure in the
canonical courts, in the old courts of Continental Europe, and in
equity courts. It was a practice which the common law courts, and
advocates of the common law system, resisted stoutly.36 Beginning in
34. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,352-53 (1992).
35. U.S. CONST., amend. VI
36. See, e.g., Case of the Union of the Realms, 72 E.R. 908, 913 (1604). Interestingly,
at the same time, at least in civil cases, the common law courts found the deposition
procedure of equity to be very useful when a witness was not able to testify at trial. But by
the middle of the seventeenth century a sophisticated body of law-remarkably similar to
the modem FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1)-had evolved restricting the circumstances in which
depositions might be used, thus protecting the adversary's right of cross-examination. See,
e.g., Fortescue v. Coake, Godb. 193,78 E.R. 117 (Com. Pleas 1612); Anon., Godb. 326,78
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the middle of the sixteenth century, long before any rule against
hearsay had gelled, we find a drumbeat of demands by defendants,
recurrently supported by Parliament, for "face-to-face"
• 31
confrontation.
Now, if Thomas's statement to the police were admissible against
Lee, Thomas would effectively be testifying against Lee, behind
closed doors, not under oath, and with no opportunity for cross-
examination. That is intolerable, so long as Thomas's failure to testify
at trial under oath and subject to cross-examination was not procured
by Lee's own wrongdoing. Suppose Thomas testified in court against
Lee, but before he could be cross-examined he died suddenly,
through no fault of any of the parties. I do not believe there would be
much doubt that Thomas's direct testimony would have to be struck
and could not support a verdict-even if it seemed highly reliable.38
Why should it be any different if Thomas testifies out of court, and if
the cause of his unavailability for cross-examination is privilege rather
than death?
I am suggesting here that the accused's right to confront the
maker of a testimonial statement is not limited to a truth-
determination basis. I believe that the right should be absolute,
subject only to forfeiture for misconduct.39 Why?
Presumably confrontation does assist truth determination, and
that is important, especially given that the evidence at stake is offered
by the prosecution. Recall that for prosecution evidence to be
admissible it must be supported by a very high ratio of error
avoidance to error creation. A practice that is good in most cases for
truth determination can become a norm that develops into a right.
But I believe the confrontation right has standing of its own, and it
should apply even where doing so hurts truth determination."
E.R. 192 (K.B. 1623); Rushworth v. Countess de Pembroke, Hardres 472, 145 E.R. 553
(Ct. Exchequer 1668).
37. See, e.g., Seymour's Case, 1 How. St. Tr. 483, 492 (1549); Duke of Somerset's
Trial, 1 How. St. Tr. 515, 517, 520 (1551); 5 & 6 Edw. 6 ch. 11, § 12 (1552) (Eng.); 1 & 2
Phil. & M. ch. 10, § 11 (1554) (Eng.).
38. See Commonwealth v. Kirouac, 542 N.E.2d 270, 273 & 273 n.5 (Mass. 1989)
(reversing conviction for indecent assault and battery on a child under 14 when child
refused to answer questions under cross-examination).
39. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (holding that defendant can lose his
right to be present at his trial if his disruptive behavior continues after proper warning).
Forfeiture may also occur if misconduct renders the potential witness unable to testify at
trial. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). I have written on forfeiture in Confrontation and the
Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 506 (1997).
40. Callen discusses confusion between the value of cross-examination and the
inferential processes it serves. See Callen, supra note 15, at 94. Outside the confrontation
context, I have argued in this paper that our preeminent concern should be for truth
determination and the inferential processes that play a part in it. If admitting a statement
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A testimonial statement is not mere trace evidence. It is not
merely a consequence of the events at issue; the pending prosecution
itself had a role in its creation. As in Lee, it is made with the anticipa-
tion (and sometimes also the desire) that it will assist in the
prosecution of a crime. It may also have been made, as in Lee, at the
instance, or with the participation, of prosecuting authorities. The
essence of a trial-a test-is the testing of evidence. To allow
testimony, whether given in court or not, to be presented to the
factfinder without giving the accused the opportunity to confront the
witness would deprive the accused of the testing that a trial is
supposed to provide. This is not a new idea, or one limited to the
common law system; its origins go back to Roman times and before.4'
It is not sufficient to say that an accusatory statement should be
admitted because it assists truth determination. The right to test the
testimony is valuable in itself.
Conclusion
I have focused on two polar cases. One is a civil case in which I
believe that the hearsay statement should clearly be admitted because
it assists truth determination. The other is a criminal case in which
prosecution evidence that is testimonial in nature should be excluded
notwithstanding the fact that it would assist in truth determination.
Trying to determine just what are the decisive differences between
these two cases is not an easy matter. I have put a great deal of
weight on the concept of testimonial statements, because it is with
respect to these that I believe values other than truth determination
become decisive. I have not tried to define "testimonial" precisely.
In Lee, the statement was made with the anticipation that it would be
used for prosecution. I believe that should be enough, even without
prosecutorial participation in the creation of the statement, but this is
that has not been subjected to cross-examination assists the search for truth, the statement
should be admitted. But I am arguing that in the confrontation setting the right to cross-
examination, as well as the right to ensure that testimony is made openly and under oath,
do not merely serve the inferential process.
41. The Book of Acts quotes the Roman governor Festus as declaring: "It is not the
manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he which is accused have the
accusers face to face, and have licence to answer for himself concerning the crime laid
against him." Acts 25:16, (King James 1607). See also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015-16
(1988). Nor was it the practice of the Hebrews. The book of Deuteronomy requires
multiple witnesses for convictions. See Deut. 19:15-19. And yet it was sometimes held
sufficient to have a single witness to each of several recurrences of the same crime. The
Essenes, the people of the Dead Sea Scrolls, took advantage of this rule by preserving the
testimony of an accusing witness, in the form of a deposition taken in the presence of the
defendant. See generally Lawrence Schiffman, The Law of Testimony, in SECrARIAN
LAW IN THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS (1983).
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a difficult point and I have not argued it here.42
And what of intermediate cases? In criminal cases as well as in
civil, much hearsay is not testimonial, and this should be treated
hospitably, especially, given the analysis in Part I, when it is offered
by the defense.
The more difficult problems, it seems to me, are posed by
testimonial out-of-court statements offered by civil litigants or by
criminal defendants. There is certainly some argument for saying that
these litigants, like a prosecutor, should not be able to create out-of-
court testimonial statements that they will then use at trial without
cross-examination. On the other hand, neither the constitutional
right of confrontation, nor the long history associated with it, support
exclusion in these circumstances. When a criminal prosecutor offers a
testimonial statement, the asymmetrical balance of power and the
asymmetry of the stakes suggest that it is the prosecutor who ought to
bear the risk that, through the fault of neither party, the witness will
be unable to testify at trial. These factors will not generally be
present when the proponent is a civil litigant or a criminal defendant.
Moreover, it certainly makes sense for private parties to be able to
prepare documents, such as receipts and written memoranda of
agreements, with the idea that they will be used as evidence should
matters turn into a litigated dispute; it is not clear that statements
prepared for evidentiary use, after matters have indeed turned to
litigation, should be treated differently. I find this a perplexing
problem and there, for the moment, I will leave it.
In any event, my essential thesis is this: The theme of "truth and
its rivals" provides a useful perspective for considering how the law of
hearsay should be revamped. In most contexts, truth determination-
minimizing the cost of inaccuracy-should be the pre-eminent
consideration governing evidentiary law, and this weighs in favor of
admitting hearsay. But when evidence that is testimonial in nature is
offered against a criminal defendant, another value, the longstanding
right of the accused to confront the witness against him, demands the
exclusion of some evidence even though it might assist the search for
truth.
42. I pursue the matter further in another article. Richard D. Friedman,
Confrontation: The Search for First Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998).
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